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Introduction
In recent years, few developments in international economics have elicited more interest or stirred more controversy than the sudden emergence of China as a trading nation and manufacturing center.
1 China's high rate of economic growth since the adoption of more liberal economic policies under Deng Xiao-Ping in the late 1970s, while perhaps exaggerated by the official statistics, is nevertheless a stunning accomplishment. 2 In the space of less than a generation, China has transformed itself from a poor nation almost completely cut off from the global economy to one of the world's most important suppliers of labor-intensive manufactures.
Its arrival into the ranks of trading nations will be complete when it is has achieved its intention to join the World Trading Organization (WTO).
Nevertheless, a number of economists have recently called into question the sustainability of China's current rates of GDP and export growth. These observers have tended to point out the shortcomings of China's "socialist market economy," focusing on the inability of the government to raise revenue by taxing the new private economy, the problems the government has encountered in reforming state owned enterprises, the distortions created by China's dualistic trade regime, and the mounting "non performing loans" problem in the Chinese banking sector.
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In a striking paper, Alwyn Young (1997) has recently argued that China's high trade/GDP ratio is a sign of intra-national trade barriers rather than international economic openness. Particularly since the onset of the East Asian financial crisis, the consensus has shifted to a more pessimistic outlook for China.
The reality of important distortions in the Chinese economy, and particularly in its international trade regime, is increasingly evident. We offer, in this paper, what is to our capital equipment for export production. They also qualified for concessionary income tax rates and tax holidays.
As noted, domestic firms still had to trade indirectly, obtaining imports and channeling exports through foreign trade companies (FTCs). 9 To be sure, the original twelve monopolies were broken up, and by the late 1980s there were more than 5,000 FTCs operating throughout China. However, most of these FTCs were limited to trade in certain commodities, operation in a particular province, and were only allowed to service certain kinds of customers. Thus, domestic enterprises seeking to interact with the global economy had to work through a legally mandated, far from perfectly competitive layer of middlemen. On top of this, most domestic imports are not duty-free, so that domestic firms have had to contend with China's formal and informal barriers to trade. While tariffs have come down over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, they are still high. On top of these tariff barriers, some 20 percent of Chinese imports are subject to formal non-tariff barriers
The next major regulatory change in FDI came in 1986, with the implementation of the so-called "Twenty-two Regulations." These changes represented a major liberalization which applied throughout China. Foreign invested enterprises were made eligible for reduced business income tax rates regardless of location, and were given increased managerial autonomy. Tight controls on the remittance of profit in foreign currencies were lifted. In addition, the Twentytwo Regulations designated two categories of foreign investments as being eligible for additional special benefits -"export oriented" projects (defined as projects exporting 50% or more of their production value) and "technologically advanced" projects (defined as projects which upgrade domestic production capacity through the use of 'advanced' technology).
The Twenty-two Regulations also set up an approval process for foreign direct investment projects which remains in place today, albeit with some modification. The approval process is a complex one involving thirteen agencies and branches of the central government as well as local Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Commissions. While the formal regulatory framework implies substantial centralization of power over the approval process and subsequent regulatory oversight of FIEs, there is considerable debate among China scholars as to how much the central government intervenes in the oversight of FIEs after they are established. In practice, there seems to be a considerable degree of de facto local autonomy in regulating FIEs.
The next major shift in FDI in China marked not so much a regulatory shift as a change in the composition of foreign investors. FDI in China slowed briefly after the events of Tiananmen square in 1989, but resumed and quickly grew in the 1990s. 10 Whereas FDI in China in the 1980s had been overwhelmingly dominated by Hong Kong and Taiwan-based investors seeking to exploit relatively low cost labor in the SEZs for export processing, in the 1990s FDI in China increasingly consisted of investments by Western and Japanese multinationals seeking to serve the Chinese market through local production capacity. It is also important to point out that FDI inflows in the post-1990 area were much larger than those of the 1980s, both in absolute quantities and as a percentage of GDP. Finally, in the later 1980s and 1990s, FDI began to flow in significant quantities into the centers of China's (state-owned) heavy industry manufacturing and finance. Of these, Shanghai and the neighboring provinces are the clear standouts. Figure 1 illustrates the cumulative stock of FDI into China's 30 provinces (not counting the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) in 1995. The variation across regions is quite 10 Naughton (1996) , among others, suggests that there was a de facto loosening of the official regulations on foreign direct investment which allowed multinationals to skirt the official export requirements. Essentially, export requirements were increasingly ignored or the definition of a "technologically advanced" project was broadened to allow even not particularly technology-intensive firms to set up plants to serve the Chinese market.
striking, with Guangdong province, the site of three of the initial four SEZs, and neighboring Fujian, the site of the fourth, maintaining dominant positions as the most important sites of FIE activity. On the other hand, Shanghai and the surrounding provinces have received very substantial inflows starting from a very low base in the late 1980s, such that they have collectively become the next-largest recipient area by 1995.
Firm Interviews
Given the enormous variations in central government policy and regional government implementation across provinces and across time, we felt it was important to obtain some direct qualitative information concerning the regulatory environment on the operations of multinational firms. To this end, one of the authors traveled to China in the winter of 1998, interviewing executives and former executives of more than 20 multinationals, consulting firms, research institutions, and advisory agencies in China. We have also consulted with China experts in the U.S. and in China itself.
One of the most important impressions obtained in China could be summarized as follows: "For every anecdote in China, there is an equal and opposite anecdote." One comes to understand the limits of qualitative field research rather quickly, as the experience of firms varies so widely across industries, provinces, firms, and time. This truth was forcibly driven home to the authors when different firms in the same industry in the same province would tell strikingly different stories about their experience in the Chinese market.
Nevertheless, some consistent themes emerged from our discussions with firm managers, which reinforce some of the key assumptions in our modeling framework. The first is that most of the foreign invested enterprises we interviewed do, in fact, compete with state-owned firms to some degree. In some industries, the FIEs have already collectively obtained a dominant market position, such that the state-owned enterprises have been confined to the less profitable low end of the product market.
The second is that the Chinese government, both national and local, is acutely aware of this competition, and has taken steps to impede the ability of foreign firms to compete in the Chinese market. Scholars of the Chinese economy will be familiar with the nexus of restrictions on the operations of multinationals that were described to us by multinational executives. They include export requirements, localization requirements, requirements for technology transfer, restrictions on domestic market access, and difficulties in recruiting and retaining key personnel -a feature of the Chinese economy which is exacerbated by government policy. A number of multinational managers also complained bitterly about attempts by provincial and even local governments to extract funds from foreign firms through both legal and illegal surcharges and taxes. While, on paper, foreign firms get favorable tax and import treatment, in practice, figuring in all of the restrictions and extralegal surcharges, it is clear that, in many cases, foreign firms are operating with a clear, government-engineered disadvantage.
Third, our presumption of limited economic integration among Chinese provincesdrawn from Young (1997) -received surprisingly strong support from discussions with expatriate managers and native Chinese executives. While the extent of local protectionism varies across industries, it is seen as a barrier to growth and economic efficiency by nearly every firm we interviewed. As one Shanghai-based advisor to American firms put it, "There is no China market. There are several China markets, and none of them are as big as you think."
These various inferences from our firm interviews will be built into the model that we propose to capture the tradeoffs faced by provincial and central authorities, as they consider the policies towards foreign direct investment and trade.
The Model
The model we develop draws heavily from Grossman and Helpman (1996) , who apply the political-economy framework developed in their 1994 paper to the issue of multinationals.
Specifically, they investigate whether the entry of multinationals will affect the level of protection, and conversely, in a model where the domestic industry is making campaign contributions. In our model, we will suppose instead that the domestic industry is owned by the government, which gives extra weight to industry profits in its objective function. 11 The presence of multinationals presents a potential threat to the state-owned enterprises through product market competition. Li and Chen (1998) use a framework like this to examine the government's ability to extract rents from the multinationals, and we will use policy instruments similar to theirs. Our key findings concerning the shape of the government's objective function, depending on the entry of multinationals, are not developed in either of these related papers, however.
Because some features of our model are familiar, we will try to present it as concisely as possible. The following points summarize the main components:
Regions: We will treat the regions within the country as distinct, following Young's (1997) thesis that the provinces within China have only limited trade with each other. Thus, the model below describes each region, which will differ in terms of their underlying parameters.
Products: Each regional economy produces a numeraire good denoted by x 0 , and a differentiated product which is a CES aggregate of the various varieties. There are three sources 11 As Naughton (1996) and several other authors have noted, the Chinese government still relies on remittances from state-owned enterprises for about two-thirds of its revenue. This is also true at the provincial level. The provincial government of Yunnan is rumored to obtain nearly all of its revenue from the provincial tobacco monopoly.
for the products: n h varieties are produced by home firms; n f varieties are produced by foreign firms, where m of these are produced locally by multinationals, and the remaining (n f -m) are imported into the country.
Consumers:
Consumer preferences are given by,
where the CES aggregate is,
The values x j denote consumption of the differentiated varieties from source j=h (home firms), f (imported), and m (multinationals).
Letting p j denote the prices of each goods j=h,f,m, we can maximize utility subject to the budget constraint x 0 +n h p h x h +(n f -m)p f x f +mp m x m =I to obtain:
where q is a price index,
Note the ε>1 is the own-price elasticity of demand for each variety, while θ > 0 is the elasticity of demand for the CES aggregate. We add the restriction that ε > θ, which ensures that the cross-price elasticity for each variety is positive.
Firms:
Costs for the locally produced products are c j , j=h,m. Costs for products produced abroad are c f , but also face a specific tariff of τ, so that marginal costs become c f + τ. Then firms at home and abroad maximize profits given by,
Using the demand equations in (3), and optimizing over the choice of p j , we obtain the prices:
Substituting these prices into (5), we obtain the profits of each type of firm:
Factors: We will suppose that labor is the only factor of production, and one unit of the numeraire is produced with one unit of labor, so wages are unity. While workers in the home industry producing differentiated products earn unity, we shall assume that the multinational firms pay a wage premium of (w−1) > 0. 12 Despite this premium, we will still suppose that is it cheaper for the multinational to supply local demand from local production, than from imports which are subject to the tariff. That is, we assume, 12 The existence of this wage premium is strongly confirmed in our data and in our interviews with multinational managers. The managers suggested that, since multinationals typically employ more capital and technology intensive production processes, they require the best workers in the local labor pool. Hence, they pay what the labor literature has referred to as "efficiency wages." Other case studies have documented the need to pay Chinese workers employed in multinationals a wage premium to offset the "envy" created by the even higher wage earned by their American counterparts in these firms.
This assumption is needed to ensure that the multinational firms have any interest in entering the local market.
Policy towards multinationals:
Each foreign firm faces the decision of whether to supply locally through imports, or through setting up a local plant which requires a fixed cost of F>0.
We suppose that the government also charges the multinational an profit tax of λ > 0. This instrument is supposed to reflect the vast range of actual policies used in China to extract rents from multinationals, and not just the nominal tax on multinationals. For example, the fact that most multinationals have had to use local partners reflects an implicit tax on their profits, which are shared with the partner; similarly, the land-use fees that are commonly charged reduce the multinationals' profits. By modeling these policies as a tax on profits, we are abstracting from the inefficiencies caused by actual policies (such as local content restrictions, for example).
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This is similar to the "entry fee" used by Li and Chen (1998) , and is in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1994) , who draw on Bernheim and Whinston (1984) to argue that the outcome of political contests can be efficient.
The profits earned locally are thus (1-λ)π m -F, with π m defined by (5a) and (6a).
Alternately, the multinational could just export to the home country, and earn π f defined by (5b) and (6b). Thus, entry will occur if and only (1-λ)π m -F > π f . Using (7), this condition is written:
We will assume that when m=λ=0 then (9) holds as a strict inequality. This means that for some positive λ, entry of multinationals will occur.
Government Objective Function:
We can now state the total returns to each interest group, beginning with consumers/workers, who receive a weight of α in the objective function. It is readily verified that maximized utility from (1) Including this within labor income, we obtain utility of,
where L is the labor endowment of the region. To obtain the second line of (10), we combine (3) and (4) 
We will suppose that the domestic firms are state-owned, so these profits accrue to the regional and national government. Profits of the domestic firms are n h π h = n h p h x h /ε, from (6).
We give revenue from state-owned firms a weight β in the objective function. Finally, the government extracts rents mλπ m from the multinationals, and also collects tariff revenue of τ(n f − m)x f . These two sources of revenue are each given weights of unity.
The objective function for each region is defined as,
where the equality follows using (10). Several properties of this function are summarized by:
where s j , j=h,f,m denotes the share of domestic spending on home, imported or multinational products. Then:
, then G is quasi-concave. If θ>1 these conditions ensure that G is increasing, while if θ<1 then slightly stronger conditions are needed;
In (12), we show that ∂G/∂m consists of three terms. The first involves s h , the share of home firms in domestic spending, and reflects the product market competition between the multinationals and the home firms: if βs h is high as compared to α, then this term is negative.
The second term reflects the loss in import revenue as multinationals enter, as first analyzed by Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) . The third term reflects the wage premium generated by employment in the multinationals and the profit tax levied on these firms, both of which generate a gain in welfare.
Part ( While Proposition 1 gives us the properties of G with respect to m, we do not suppose that the government directly controls entry of multinationals. Instead, entry is influenced through the tax rate λ and the tariff rate τ, so the number of multinational firms is written as a function m(λ,τ). Multinationals react in the expected manner to changes in these policies:
Lemma 2
When (9) holds as an equality, then λ d dm < 0 and τ d dm > 0.
We are now in a position to setup and solve the governments' problem. We suppose that the central and the regional governments jointly determine the rents appropriated from the multinationals in each region. The central government also chooses the tariff rate. Denoting regions by the subscript i, we let G i [m i (λ i ,τ),λ i ,τ] denote the objective function for each region.
Then the profit tax and tariff are chosen to solve:
subject to m i (λ i ,τ) < n f , which is the maximum number of foreign firms willing to enter any region. Our strong assumption in writing the objective function as in (13) is that the tax rate λ i for one region is separable from that in another region. This is an extreme version of Young's (1997) thesis that the provinces in China have only limited trade with each other. If there is no trade between provinces, then they will not be in competition with one another for foreign investment, because multinationals can only serve the market where they locate. While this case does not literally apply in China, it is certainly true that foreign firm face restrictions on their ability to market outside their immediate area. 16 By assuming an extreme form of these restrictions, we greatly simplify the governmental decision problem.
16 Some "native" Chinese firms face these restrictions as well. In interviews, one Chinese executive ruefully noted that while the government has been bringing in "multinational" enterprises for twenty years, few truly "multiprovincial" enterprises are allowed to operate within China itself! We also denote all other variables in region i with that subscript, though for simplicity we suppose this does not apply to the foreign price p f , or the number of foreign firms n f . The following result describes the solution to (13) over the choice of the tax rate λ i , while a discussion of the solution for tariffs τ is postponed until section 7.
Proposition 1
Suppose that G i is increasing in m i . Then region i will choose the tax rate λ i to allow entry of multinationals to the point where either m i =n f or,
A point satisfying (14) is a global maximum of G i over the choice of λ i provided that
, and also that s mi < (ε-1)/(ε-θ) when (14) holds.
The optimality condition (14) is illustrated at point A in Figure 2 , where the slope of the curve G i equals -m i π mi /(∂m i /∂λ i ). This magnitude reflects the fall in the revenue λ i m i π mi when the tax rate is lowered to attract more multinationals. That is, the regions are acting as monopsonists as they attract foreign capital. This can be contrasted with the competition for foreign capital that is often modeled between industrial countries or regions, and that is ruled out in our framework by the assumption of limited trade between the regions.
Condition (14) leads to a global optimum under the conditions of Lemma1(a), and also s mi < (ε-1)/(ε-θ), which is automatically satisfied when θ>1 so that (ε-1)/(ε-θ)>1. If instead the conditions of Lemma1(b) hold, so that G i is quasi-convex in m i , then it is still possible for the problem (13) to have an interior maximum: the fact that the regions are acting as monopsonists, and recognize that multinational entry is affected by the profit tax, leads to further concavity in
In our estimation, we will confirm that the second-order conditions are in fact satisfied.
We can now use the results from Proposition 1 to develop an estimating equation. We add the subscript i to the variables in (12), and replace s mi with 1-s hi -s fi on the right-hand side.
This is set equal to the right-hand side of (14), as required for optimality. The resulting equation can be simplified by using (9) as an equality. Finally, we also add a time subscript to all relevant variables. We obtain the following equation for the share of spending on products of multinationals in region i and year t:
The first term on the right-side of (15) is the share of spending on domestic state-owned firms, which enters with the coefficient -β. Thus, the weight on state-owned firms in the regional objective function is simply obtained as the coefficient on their share in the regression (15). A high weight on the state-owned firms indicates that in regions where these firms are more prevalent, the share of multinational firms will be correspondingly reduced.
The next term on the right of (15) is the wage premium paid by multinationals, which has the coefficient η≡α(ε-1)(θ-1)/(ε-θ). Following this is the wage premium times the share of spending on state-owned firms plus imports. When the wage premium is higher, we expect that regions would be more willing to accept multinationals, and this is confirmed by having a positive coefficient α(ε-1) on that variable. The estimate of ε itself comes from the next term, which is the ad valorem tariff rate times the share of spending on imports. This term reflects the loss in tariff revenue as multinationals enter, and the coefficient is -ε. Thus, combined with the former coefficient we can recover an estimate of α. The final term on the first line of (15) reflects the number of multinationals times the share of imports. For simplicity we treat n f , which is the number of foreign firms wanting to export or invest in China, as constant over regions and time, and estimate it as a coefficient.
The terms on the second line of (15) are rather complex expressions of the profit tax collected in each region, and the fixed costs of entry, entering themselves and interacted with the wage premium and tariffs. We have no way of measuring these terms, but it seems very likely that they will vary systematically across regions, and possibly also over time. Thus, we will model the terms on the second line of (15) as:
where γ i and δ t and province and year fixed-effects, and u it is a random error assumed to be uncorrelated with the variables on the first line of (15). Gathering all these terms into fixed-effects plus an error is a strong assumption, but we have no other way of dealing with them.
With this assumption, we will be able to estimate (15) with two-stage least squares applied to panel data.
Before turning to a discussion of the data, we remind the reader that we have assumed that a multinational's entry into one region will not affect its willingness to enter another region.
We could weaken this assumption somewhat by instead writing the constraint as Σ i m i (λ i ,τ) < n f .
In that way, regions are competing for a fixed stock of foreign multinationals. If this constraint is binding, it means that we would need to add a Lagrange multiplier onto the right of (14). This multiplier would be time-dependent, and would also appear on the right of (15 17 If the weight on state-owned firms β is sufficiently large, for example, then G i can be declining in m i even when multinationals are taxed at a high rate. 18 A further difficulty with incorporating zero values for the dependent variable (i.e. when multinationals are not present in a province), is that some of the right-hand side variables are then not available. In particular, the wagepremium paid by multinationals, which appears on the right of (15) directly and as an interaction term, cannot be measured when there is no such activity in the province.
Data and Estimation Issues
We have three sources of data, described in increasing order of reliability. The first is a collection of data from the provincial yearbooks for 1978 -1995 (Xinjiang Statistical Bureau , 1998 ). There are 30 provinces or autonomous regions distinguished in this source, and we will refer to it henceforth as the "regional data." This provides data on FDI, employment, wages, and output, with the latter broken down by state-owned firms, multinationals, collectives, and individual proprietorships. 19 The wage data does not begin until 1984, effectively limiting our sample to 1984-1995. It distinguishes the wages paid per worker in multinationals, state-owned enterprises, and urban collectives, with that in multinationals usually being the highest and that in urban collectives usually the lowest. 20 The wage premium was constructed in two ways. The first method (called unweighted) was to compute it as the wages paid by multinationals minus that in urban collectives, divided by that in multinationals. The second, possibly more accurate method (called weighted), was to compute the wage premium as the wages paid by multinationals minus a weighted sum of the wages paid in state-owned enterprises and urban collectives, using employment shares (from the regional data) as weights, with this difference divided by the multinational wage.
The second data source was various editions of the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks, which we judge to be more reliable than the provincial yearbooks. In the case of discrepancies, the provincial output data for state-owned firms, multinationals, collectives, and individual 19 In early years, there is no category exclusively for multinational (or foreign invested enterprises). Rather, there is a category of output attributed to "other" firms, which includes both multinationals and other stock-held companies. In later years, it was possible to separate out the stock-held companies from the multinationals using data provided. In early years this was not possible, except that we did restrict the output share of multinationals to be zero until another series for "foreign capital actually invested" became positive. 20 As in the previous footnote, in early years there is no category exclusively for multinational wages, but there is "other" wages that includes both multinationals and other stock-held companies. In later years, we could compare this "other" category with actual wages paid by multinationals, and found that they followed each other very closely. The correlation coefficient between the two series was 0.905.
proprietorships have been replaced with the corresponding figures from the Statistical Yearbooks, when the latter had this data. In a limited number of cases for 1984-1985, provincial output data for state-owned firms, multinationals, collectives, or individual proprietorships had to be imputed based on employment in these categories.
The third data source was the Chinese trade data obtained from the Customs General Administration as part of the project described in Yao (1998, 1999) .
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This source gives imports and exports broken down by Chinese province, the kind of Chinese enterprise involved in the trade (state-owned enterprise, foreign-invested enterprise, other), and the type of trade regime under which the transaction took place (ordinary trade, processing trade, other), for 1988-1995. We judge this to be our most reliable data source, and use it to correct the trade data from the provincial yearbooks, as described below.
Two methods are used to measure the share variables. In the first, we simply take the output of state-owned firms and multinationals, or the spending on imports, and measure this relative to nominal output plus imports, for 1984-1995: The problem with this method is that it does not correct for the fact that the output of both stateowned firms and multinationals is exported. In our theory we are focusing on domestic productmarket competition between these firms, and so exports should be netted out. This is especially true since a good deal of output, especially for multinationals, is for processing exports, which means that intermediate inputs are imported, had some value-added, and then exported again.
The use of nominal output will greatly overstate the actual value-added in these activities. By the same token, the use of nominal imports in the Method A will greatly overstate the imports that are not intended for processing, and potentially compete with state-owned firms.
To correct Method A for both exports and processing imports, we make use of the Chinese trade data obtained from the Customs General Administration. This allows us to measure the exports by type of firm (state-owned and multinational), and also to measure These alternative treatments of the share variables combine with our two alternative methods for computing the wage premium (weighted versus unweighted) to give us four alternative treatments of the data. Each of these four variations represent a slightly different compromise in terms of testing our theory against admittedly imperfect data. For completeness and for purposes of comparison, we will present results from all four variants. Estimation of (15) requires that we correct for endogeneity of the regressors. This occurs because the dependent variable and some independent variables are shares of domestic spending, and in our theory sum to unity: s mit +s hit +s fit =1. Thus, the share of spending on multinational output s mit (which appears on the left of 15), and the share of spending on state-owned firms s hit (which appears on the right), would tend to have a correlation of -1 by construction. We correct for this in several ways. When we measure the share of spending on multinationals, state-owned firms, and imports, we include the spending on products from collectives and individual proprietorships. 22 This means that the shares s mi, s hi, and s fit sum to less than unity.
Furthermore, we include the spending on collectives and individual proprietorships as control variables on the right of (15). For example, a reduction in spending on products from collectives will increase all of s mit, s hit, and s fit , which would tend to create a positive correlation between s mit and s hit in (15); including the spending on collectives and individual proprietorships as controls offsets this bias. Finally, we use instrumental variables when estimating (15).
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A selection of the data for 1995 is shown in Table 1 . For convenience, we report the data according to three regional groupings: Beijing and the neighboring industrial province of Tianjin; all those provinces that are coastal, and contain at least one "open coastal city" or SEZ; and then the interior provinces. For the coastal provinces, the ordering runs north to south; while for the interior provinces, the order runs roughly clockwise from north to south, and then circling around to the far inland provinces. It is readily apparent that some coastal provinces have a share of domestic spending on products of multinationals that equals or exceeds that for state-owned enterprises; the average of these two shares is 14.4% and 20.2% respectively. 24 In contrast, the interior provinces have an average share of multinationals and state-owned enterprises of 3.5% and 55.1%, respectively. This illustrates the much more limited multinational presence in the interior provinces, where the state plays a greater role.
Of course, this difference in the relative presence of multinationals versus state-owned firms in the coastal and interior provinces can be explained by the natural tendency of the multinationals to locate where transportation is easier, combined with the deliberate decision of Chinese planners to develop state-owned enterprises in the inland regions. In our estimation, we fully control for these differences by including fixed effects across provinces (and also fixed effects for each year). Thus, the identification of the political weights on stated-owned enterprises versus consumers will come from the time-series variation within each province, over 1984-1995, and not from the cross-sectional variation that is so apparent in Table 1 .
Two other variables are also needed to estimate (15). As a proxy for the number of multinational firms m it in a province in a given year, we use the cumulated stock of foreign direct investment actually utilized (in billions of US$). This was computed by taking flows of foreign direct investment from the regional data and cumulating them using a depreciation rate of 4.5%. 25 The 1995 value for this variable was shown in Figure 1 . It is interacted with the import share s fit on the right of (15), and the coefficient is then 1/(n f -m it ). For simplicity, we suppose that n f is large enough so that this coefficient can be treated as constant over time and regions, and re-write it as 1/n f when estimating (15).
Finally, the tariff variable is computed for province i in year t as a weighted average of ad valorem tariffs, based on the provincial imports of different goods multiplied by the 1996 tariff rate assessed on those good. Unfortunately, we did not have access to any earlier years of tariff data. However, we were able to include in this calculation an indicator variable, equal to one when that product is also exported by FIEs in the province, and zero otherwise. Thus, the weights used to compute the average tariff were the provincial imports of different goods times the indicator variable, indicating whether the good was also exported (and therefore produced)
by FIEs. This was done because the tariffs we are really interested are those on imported goods that potentially compete with local FIE-produced goods. Including this indicator variable ensures that only those imports which potentially compete with local FIE-produced goods are included in the weighted average tariff level. 26 These average provincial tariff levels are shown in the last column of Table 1 . Because this variable was constructed using the tariff schedule in only one year (1996) , it actually varies across provinces i rather than years t. Thus, it is re-written as τ i rather than τ t in (15).
Estimation Results
Results from regressions based on (15)- (16), using data for 1984-1995, are presented in Table 2 . Each of the four columns uses a different variant of the wage premium and the share data. The overall results are broadly similar in all variants, although the exact parameter estimates do vary. We also note that our key parameters are estimated with varying degrees of precision in these four columns. Standard errors are placed in parentheses below the respective parameter estimates.
Each regression includes a full set of provincial and year fixed effects. An estimate of the parameter β, the weight of state-owned enterprise output in the government's objective function, can be taken from the regression coefficient on the state-owned share. This coefficient is always statistically significant and, usually larger (in absolute value) than unity, though not significantly so. Estimates of α, the weight on consumer welfare, can be derived from the regression coefficients shown in the third and fourth rows of Table 2 . These estimates are reported in the first row of Table 3 , where we also repeat the estimates of β and ε. Despite some difference in the estimates over our four variations, a striking pattern emerges: we find that the weight applied to consumer welfare is much lower than that applied to the output of state-owned enterprises, with their ratio between one-fifth and one-twelfth in our estimates.
Turning to the other coefficients in Table 2 , an estimate of θ can be derived from the coefficient on the wage premium. The point estimate for θ is always negative, which contradicts our assumption in (1), but a 95% confidence interval constructed from the other coefficients includes both positive and negative values. Thus, our estimation fails to identify this parameter with any precision. The coefficient 1/n f takes the value 0.014-0.023 in Method A, and inverting this, we estimate that there is $40-70 billion of foreign capital ready to invest in any region of
China. This parameter is estimated with the wrong sign in Method B, however.
We can make use of our parameter estimates to check that the second-order conditions for the maximization problem (13) are satisfied. Proposition 1 provides us with sufficient conditions that are easily checked, depending on the choice of λ i . However, given the tariffs reported in the last column of Table 1 , and the parameter estimates in Table 3, without even including the many other ways that rents are extracted from multinationals. We conclude, therefore, that our objective function is "well behaved."
The use of instrumental variables raises the question of the validity of the instruments.
To assess this, we regress the residuals from the estimated equations on the instruments, and report in Table 2 the χ 2 statistic constructed as NR 2 from this regression. We note that this approach has been criticized in the econometrics literature for a tendency to "over-reject" the null hypothesis of validity of the over-identifying restrictions. Indeed, in one of our four regressions, the null hypothesis of validity is rejected at the 5% level, as the χ 2 test statistic is (slightly) larger than the critical value of 9.49. Otherwise, the null hypothesis is easily accepted at conventional levels.
A breakdown of the implied structural coefficients of interest is provided in Table 3 for later sub-samples of the data, the 1988-1995 period and the 1990-1995 period. As we confine our view to the later sub-samples, we lose observations and consequently precision in some of our estimates; sub-periods smaller than 1990-1995 do not yield many significant coefficients at all. In the later sub-periods, the estimated magnitudes of the weight on state-owned enterprises falls. Likewise the weight on consumer welfare rises. This is consistent with the historical trend towards liberalization, of course. However, the gap between the two weights remains substantial: for the relatively liberal 1990-95 sub-period, we find that the weight on consumer welfare is still only about one-half of the weight on state-owned enterprises. This is consistent with the pessimism among some China scholars concerning the momentum of reform of restrictions on FDI and trade.
Choosing the Tariffs
At the beginning of the paper, we motivated our topic by the desire of China to enter into the WTO, and suggested that the existing trade barriers would have to be reduced substantially to achieve this goal. To what extent does the presence of multinationals interact with that goal?
The willingness of foreign firms to invest in China certainly reflects, in part, the difficulty of importing there directly. If tariffs are reduced substantially, this raises the distinct possibility that foreign firms who are not just involved in processing trade will divest of some of their holdings. This scenario was explicitly mentioned in some of our field interviews, and reflects the fact that for firms not involved in processing trade, investment in China is an attempt to access the huge domestic market; low wages play only a secondary role.
If we accept this characterization of foreign direct investment, it suggests that a reduction in tariffs may lead to an outflow of foreign direct investment. There is no "natural experiment" that allows us to directly estimate this from data for China. However, we can use the estimates from the previous section to construct the outflow that is consistent with our theoretical model, in an attempt to judge the welfare impact.
To compute the welfare effects, we begin by characterizing the optimal tariff in a special case. Suppose that the government does not care about state-owned profits (β=0), there are no multinationals (m i =0), and the tariff is applied to a single import variety . Then it can be shown that in this simple case, the optimal tariff which maximizes (13) is:
To interpret this condition, suppose that α=0 so the government did not care about consumer welfare. Then τ*/p f =1/ε is the revenue maximizing tariff. As α > 0 then the optimal tariff is reduced below this level. 27 Note that if α=1 so that consumer welfare and revenue receive the same weights, then the optimal tariff is negative. The reason for this is that with a specific tariff and constant percentage markup (due to CES preferences), then the "terms of trade effect" is negative: raising marginal costs using the tariff leads to an even greater increase in import prices, implying that the net-of-tariff price goes up instead of down. It follows that an import subsidy is optimal. For the range of α<1 in our estimates, however, we certainly obtain a positive value for the optimal tariff τ* in (19), due to its revenue impact.
The first line of (20) ,τ) . Thus, the total impact of decreasing tariffs can be interpreted as: (i) the direct impact holding the profit tax and number of multinationals fixed; and (ii) the indirect effect through decreasing the profit tax itself so that multinationals do not exit the country.
Given this interpretation, we now compute each of the components (i) and (ii) from our model. Because the tariff is specific, it useful to measure it relative to foreign prices p f , and we also measure the regional objective function relative to total imports if the differentiated good,
Proposition 2
The total impact on a region's objective function from changing tariffs is given by (20), where:
and,
Expression (21) gives the change in welfare due to a change in the tariff, holding the number of multinationals constant. This expression is larger when there is greater political weight on state-owned enterprises, or wage premia paid by multinationals: these considerations mean that increases in the tariff above the "simple" optimum in (19) will raise welfare, whereas tariff reductions potentially lower welfare. Expression (22) value. 28 Applying this reduction to the 1996 tariffs used in our estimation (the last column of Table 1) , we obtain the proposed WTO tariffs shown in the first column of Table 4 , at the provincial level. Then using this change of tariff from their 1996 level to the WTO proposal, we evaluate the welfare impact from Proposition 2, with results shown in Table 4 .
In the first example of Table 4 , we use low values of the elasticities: ε=5 and θ=0.5. We also use the weight on consumer welfare of α=0.2, a weight on state-owned firms of β=1, and a value of 1/n f = 0.02, which are consistent with our earlier estimates. The "simple" optimal tariff in (19) for these parameters is τ*/p f = 0.15. The direct effect of lowering the tariffs is computed from (21), and the indirect effect through lowering the profit tax for multinationals is computed from (22). 29 We see that the direct welfare effect varies in sign over the provinces. Beijing has a direct welfare benefit of 2% of its import value, reflecting its rather high initial tariff (41% in Table 1 ), whereas Liaoning has a direct welfare loss because its initial tariff (23%) is less than the provincial optimum, taking into account the weight given to state-owned firms and wage premia. However, the indirect impact of lowering the profit tax for multinationals means that the gains to Beijing from tariff reduction are more than offset, and the total impact of tariff reduction becomes negative. This reversal of the direct gains, leading to overall losses, is also found for the neighboring industrial region of Tainjin, and nearly so for Fujian. These regions illustrate the idea that the losses through potential departure of multinationals can offset the direct gains from tariff reduction, making such liberalization politically difficult to achieve. This is reinforced by the negative direct effect of tariff reductions found for quite a number of other provinces.
In the second example we consider higher elasticities: ε=10 and θ=2. Higher values for either of these elasticities make it more likely that welfare gains will be found from tariff reduction. Other parameters are as before (α=0.2 and β=1), so the "simple" optimal tariff in (19) is now τ*/p f = 0.078. We find that nearly all regions now have direct gains from tariff removal, which are substantially larger than the indirect losses. For example, Beijing has a direct gain of 20.4% of its import value, which is much larger than the 2% indirect loss due to potential exit of multinationals. Gains of a smaller magnitude are observed for most other provinces. Thus, with high values for the elasticities, most provinces gain from the proposed reduction of tariffs under China's WTO proposals, but for low values of the elasticities this is not the case. Both these cases are within the range of elasticities (for ε) that we have estimated. So while we are not able to make more definite conclusions about the potential losses due to multinational exit, and whether these offset the gains due to tariff removal, this possibility is certainly within the range of our estimates.
Conclusions
After two decades of substantial reform, China's current trade and foreign investment regime remains far from open. If ever we needed a theoretical framework to explain sharp deviations of policy away from that proscribed by laissez faire economics, we need it here. Our paper represents a first attempt to apply a theoretical model based on Helpman (1994, 1996) to a policy context in which "political economy" considerations are essential for understanding and predicting the trajectory of economic reform, and then to obtain economically meaningful estimates of the model's parameters from Chinese economic data.
As in any ambitious attempt to marry a complicated structural model with imperfect data,
we have been driven to make a number of compromises. Nevertheless, the results that we end with are quite striking. To summarize, using the estimates based on our full sample, we find that the weight applied to consumer welfare is between one-fifth and one-twelfth of the weight applied to the output of state-owned enterprises. We find that governmental preferences have shifted over time, but even if we estimate the model with data from the relatively liberal 1990-95 sub-period we still find that the weight on consumer welfare is only about one-half of the weight on state-owned enterprises. Finally, we estimate the impact on regional governmental objectives of the proposed changes in tariff structure that China has put forth as part of its bid for WTO accession. We find that these changes could potentially lower the regional objective function, due to the exit of multinationals. While this result is sensitive to the elasticities that are used, it provides some quantitative backing for skepticism that China, given the current political equilibrium, would actually follow through with the proposed liberalization.
There are a number of directions in which we hope to move this research in future papers.
Most will involve more disaggregated data on multinational and state-owned production and trade. It is obvious that government and other barriers differ in systematic ways across industries, and part of the provincial variance that we are picking up in our data is really attributable to differences across provinces in industry mix. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that there are important differences in the nature of multinationals depending on the "source country." In particular, firms are affiliated with Taiwanese or Hong Kong-based foreign partners are overwhelmingly concentrated on production for export, and hence are to a great extent outside our modeling framework. With more disaggregated data, we could focus on the Western and Japan-affiliated multinationals that tend to be more focused on the Chinese market, and therefore more relevant for our model. To this end, we are currently building up an FDI data base at the project level.
Further refinements in the model might also prove worthwhile. While a more realistic depiction of the actual restrictions placed on multinationals (such as local content and export requirements) would complicate the model, it would also likely yield much more accurate estimates of the real relative weight placed on consumer welfare. If anything, our current estimates may prove to be an upper bound of the weight actually placed on consumer welfare by the Chinese government.
Proof of Lemma 1
Using (A2), we compute the derivative of G as:
while when θ<1 then slightly stronger conditions are needed. Under the hypothesis of part (b), we see that ∂G/∂m = 0 in (A7) implies that ∂ 2 G/∂m 2 > 0, so that G is quasi-convex.
Proof of Lemma 2
Treating (9) as an equality, the derivatives with respect to m are given by (A2). Then totally differentiating (9), we obtain,
Again treating (9) as an equality, we can totally differentiate and use (A2) and (A4) to obtain, 
When dG/dm = 0, then d 2 G/d 2 m < 0 provided that the second line is non-negative. Using π mi = λ i π mi + F it + π f , a sufficient condition for this is s mi < (ε-1)/(ε-θ).
To evaluate this second-derivative numerically, we can divide by total expenditure on the differentiated good, so that π mi =p mi x mi /ε becomes substitute for s mi /(mε). We also need to specify the fixed costs F it , and we choose the conservative value of zero, which leads to a higher value for the second-derivative.
Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating (11) using (A4), the partial derivative with respect to τ is,
Substituting for G i from (11), and simplifying, we obtain (21). To obtain (22), we compute
from (A9) and (A10), and simplify. The sample consists of 29 provinces (excluding Tibet) over 1984-1995, using fixed effects for provinces and for time; only provinces with positive multinational output are included (N=297). The regressions are estimated with TSLS, using as instruments the sales of state-owned firms, value of imports, lagged FDI stock, output, wage premium, and the interaction between the wage premium and these four variables. In addition, the sales of collectives and of independent firms are included as control variables and as instruments, though these coefficient are not reported above. The weighted regression use provincial value of output as a weight. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The test for exogeneity of instruments, reported in the last line, is constructed by regressing the residual from the structural equation on the instruments. The value reported equals 297 times the R 2 from this auxiliary regression, and is distributed χ 2 (4) under the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. The 5% critical values for this test statistic is 9.49. 
